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ABSTRACT
The Army Acquisition Officer lacks proficient experience needed to fill key leadership
positions within the Acquisition Corps. The active duty Army officer is considered for the
Acquisition Corps functional area between their 5th and 9th years of service as an officer – after
completing initial career milestones. The new Acquisition Corps officer is the rank of senior
Captain or Major when he arrives to his first acquisition assignment with a proficiency level of
novice (in acquisition). The Army officer may be advanced in his primary career branch, but his
level decreases when he is assigned into the Acquisition Corps functional area. The civilian
grade equivalent to the officer is a GS-12 or GS-13 whose proficiency level is advanced in his
career field. The purpose of this study is to use a systems analysis approach to decompose the
current acquisition officer professional development system, in order to study how well the
current active duty officer flow works and how well it interacts or influences an acquisition
officer’s professional development; and to propose a potential solution to assist in the
management of Army acquisition officers, so they gain proficiency through not only education
and training, but also the hands-on experience that is needed to fill key leadership positions in
the Army Acquisition Corps. An increased proficiency and proven successful track record in the
acquisition workforce is the basis to positively affect acquisition streamlining processes within
the Department of Defense by making good decisions through quality experience.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
According the U.S. House of Armed Services Committee Hearing No 113-66 (2013), the
Department of Defense (DOD) has undergone various amounts of Acquisition reform over the
course of 25 years, in order to streamline its processes. These reformations focused on policies
and procedures, improving the workforce, and the acquisition system performance as a whole.
For example, increased educational requirements for military and civilian acquisition personnel
in the 1990s; capabilities-based approach vice threat-based in 2003; appointments of personnel in
2009 to report to or advise the Secretary of Defense or to report to Congress; and a multitude of
policy and procedure changes.
According to Kerber et al. (2009), it typically takes 10-15 years to acquire a major system
while the commercial sector takes one-third to one-half of that time. And, the acquisition of
information technology for defense systems takes three to four times as long, which also exceeds
the commercial sector’s development time (p. 1). The Defense Science Board identified four
critical elements for creating a strategic acquisition platform to address the DOD acquisition
process: (1) buy the right things, (2) select an effective leadership team, (3) reform and
streamline the acquisition process, and (4) improve acquisition execution. Two of these four
elements focused on the need for experienced personnel in the workforce and in leadership
positions (pp. 5-7). The board made a point that “acquisition improvements are not enabled by
policy and process reforms alone” (p. 7). It is viable to have experienced acquisition personnel
and leaders with a proven acquisition success for management and leadership positions, so as to
make decisions based on “judgment through experience” (p. 14).
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According to Thompson (2011), one of the top five reasons for the cancellation of weapons
programs is managerial incompetence. That is not to say that military program managers and
supervisors are (just) mentally incompetent to manage programs or products. The argument in
the article for managerial incompetence is the level of understanding and experience in
technology and business processes that military officers lack when they transition into program
or product management positions based on the current officer professional development process.
This article echoed the findings of the Defense Science Board report conducted in April 2009 –
lack of experienced leaders with proven acquisition success.
According the U.S. House of Armed Services Committee Hearing No 113-66 (2013), some
analysts argued that the fundamental problems within acquisition lie not in policy, but the
execution and expectations - a good workforce is the key to acquisition success (p. 9). In
November 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense, Frank Kendall (2012), published Better Buying
Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending
through a memorandum for the Defense Acquisition Workforce. One of the initiatives he had
emphasized was the importance to improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce
through higher standards for key leadership positions and recognition of excellence in acquisition
management. Kendall also noted that leaders must have the qualification to fill their position,
not just certifications. These qualifications include relevant experience, education, and training;
and the current qualification standards do not have enough hands-on experience that is truly
needed to become proficient enough to handle the responsibilities of a key leader (Kendall, 2012,
p. 6).
This paper uses a systems analysis approach to decompose the acquisition officer professional
development system, in order to study how well the current active duty officer flow works and
2

interacts or influences an acquisition officer’s professional development; and to propose a
potential solution to assist in the management of Army acquisition officers, so they gain
proficiency through not only education and training, but also the hands-on experience that is
needed to fill key leadership positions in the Army Acquisition Corps. This is in the scope with
Secretary Kendall’s initiative to improve the acquisition workforce. If the workforce have
experienced personnel and leaders, then their good acquisition decisions may positively affect
streamlining processes.
The primary research question is: Is the current U.S. Army active duty officer professional
development model adequate to develop an acquisition officer whose primary career field
designation is program management? In order to answer this question, the thesis will review the
improvements that have been made to improve military acquisitions - organization, policy,
modeling and simulation, education, training; the current professional development career path
that an active duty Army acquisition officer undergoes; competency-based career planning and
development; and presents an alternate professional development career path for acquisition
officers that will improve their acquisition proficiency level to expert by the time they are in a
key developmental acquisition assignment. This research can be used as supportive literature to
develop a functional discrete event simulation model with confirmed stakeholder input and
output performance variables to further analyze Army acquisition officer personnel management,
in order to improve the professional development of acquisition officers so that they are on a
path that leads them to the highest proficiency in their career field and at least equivalent to their
civilian counterpart after their first acquisition assignment; and as a building block for continued
refinement of the overall acquisition personnel management process.

3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Army Acquisition Streamlining

Acquisition has become an “umbrella” for the cradle-to-grave defense life cycle system that
encompasses procurement, logistics, science and technology, research, development,
engineering, contracting, sustainment, and maintenance (Stark, 2014). Acquisitions within the
U.S. Army have underdone incremental changes to streamline its activities, chains of command,
and education and experience requirements. According to Fox (2011), in the 1960s, Senator
McNamara promoted centralized decision-making to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) which allowed for a new planning, programming, and budgeting system where its
systems analysis would be used to make informed decisions by the secretary of defense and other
decision makers in the Pentagon (p. 38). Senator McNamara also testified, in 1964, before the
House Appropriations Committee that “ a point of central control and information in the form of
a program manager for each weapon system...This is a key position in our military departments,
demanding the best managerial talents on which I want to place full reliance for our future
weapons inventories.” (p. 39). Senator McNamara’s recommendations to changes within
military acquisitions clearly identified the need for reform.
This chapter will provide a background of acquisition reformation that have taken place
within DoD and the Army. It lays the foundation of “why” the military, particularly the Army,
needs to focus their efforts on the professional development of an active duty Army acquisition
officer to offer more hands-on experience, as another step to streamline the acquisition process.
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2.1.1 Organization and Policy
In 1986, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management presented their
final report to the President of the United States of their year-long study which includes findings
and recommendations for national security planning and budgeting, acquisition organization,
military organization and command, and government-industry accountability (p. xvii). The
commission’s findings and recommendations for the acquisition organization were based on their
observations and research of acquisition management procedures within the Department of
Defense (DoD) compared to successful programs in private industry, which took half the time to
develop and cost less. Although both defense and civil programs had their own bureaucratic
challenges to overcome, they noted six management features that were reflected in successful
commercial programs:
1. Clear command channels – no unambiguous chain of command. The program manager (PM)
reports directly to the chief executive officer (CEO).
2. Stability – the PM enters into an agreement with the CEO on cost, performance, and schedule;
and the CEO does not authorize full development until he receives support from the board of
directors and funding is approved.
3. Limited reporting requirements – PM to CEO.
4. Small, high-quality staffs – highly-qualified personnel hand-selected by the PM who focuses
on managing the program rather than defending it.
5. Communications with users – PM establishes and maintains communication with the users to
include mutual understanding of initial trade-offs, so that the PM is motivated to address
problems and challenges instead of hide them.
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6. Prototyping and testing - Unproven technology is tested under simulated conditions before
final design approval and production (pp. 50-51).
Recognizing these successful management features within programs in private industry, the
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission (1986) recommended the following nine (9) actions to be
implemented within defense acquisitions:
1. Streamline acquisition organization and procedures – appoint an Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) who serves as Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) responsible for the
management of the defense acquisition system; each military service establishes a Service
Acquisition Executive (SAE) responsible for executing policy and procedures from the DAE and
reportable to the DAE for all programs within his service; each SAE appoints Program Executive
Officers (PEO) that are responsible for a defined number of acquisition programs; streamline
acquisition procedures into a single, simplified procurement statue; and DoD should reduce the
number of acquisition personnel in order to eliminate duplicative efforts, lengthy chains of
command, and establish an environment for PMs and staff to concentrate on operating as centers
of excellence.
2. Use technology to reduce cost – prototyping and testing should be done earlier in research and
development to determine whether new technology can improve a military capability and
provide realistic cost estimates prior to full-scale production.
3. Balance cost and performance – restructure the Joint Requirements and Management Board
(JRMB) to be responsible for recommending trade-off decisions for non-developmental items.
4. Stabilize programs – determine and institutionalize a baseline for weapon systems at the
initiation of full-scale engineering development and expand the use of multi-year procurement
for high-priority systems.
6

5. Expand the use of commercial products – apply commercial products as seen fit and reduce
the amount military specifications as required.
6. Increase the use of competition – eliminate legal and regulatory provisions.
7. Clarify the need for technical data rights – adopt technical data rights policy to define the
need for technical data rights based on private funds, government funds, or a mix of both; and
implement this guidance in the federal acquisition regulation (FAR) and supplemented in the
DoD FAR supplement (DFARS).
8. Enhance the quality of acquisition personnel – expand on and improve the education and
experience criteria for civilian acquisition personnel in order to attract and retain high caliber
professionals.
9. Improve the capability for industrial mobilization – plan for surge and industrial mobilization
in case of a change in threat (pp. 52-71).
Some of the findings and recommendations of the final report from the President’s Blue
Ribbon Commission were reflected in Public Law (PL) 99-433, otherwise known as the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In particular,
reorganization within the DoD included streamlining the acquisition chains of command and
limited outside influences in acquisition activities (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The results were a
three-level acquisitions chain of command; and limited direct influence in the acquisition process
from the chief and deputy chiefs of staff of the Army, Army Materiel Command, and its
subordinate materiel commands. The chief and deputy chiefs of staff role changed to support
and coordination with no direct reporting requirements. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the
acquisition chain of command was ambiguous with conflicting lines of authority (Nemfakos,
Blickstein, McCarthy & Sollinger, 2010).
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Figure 2-1: Army Acquisition Chain of Command Prior to Goldwater-Nichols
Note. Adapted from The Perfect Storm: The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Its Effect on Navy
Acquisition, by Nemfakos, C., Blickstein, I., McCarthy, A.S., & Sollinger, J.M. (2010), Santa
Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

Figure 2-2: Army Acquisition Chain of Command 2014
Note. Adapted from The Defense Acquisitions: Observations on Whether the Military Service
Chiefs’ Role in Managing and Overseeing Major Weapon Programs Should be Expanded, by
United States Government Accountability Office. (2014), Washington: GAO.
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The reorganization of the acquisition management structure was questionable with regards to
the change in the service chief’s role in management and oversight of major weapon programs.
The Senate Armed Service Committee mandated a GAO review in fiscal year 2014 to review the
acquisition chain of command in DoD. To accomplish the review, GAO conducted a four-month
study which included the analysis of six previous studies of acquisition reform dated 2005
through 2012 and interviewing those authors; DoD and military acquisition policies, procedures,
and guideline; and interviewed acquisition officials in each service level within the military to
gather information on how the policies were being executed and receive their views on the
current acquisition chain of command. The GAO (2014) review revealed that service chiefs
have the opportunity to be involved in the acquisition process with primary responsibility during
requirements development and resourcing processes (p. 6); however, GAO did not have enough
evidentiary support to determine whether the service chiefs were actively involved and
influential in major programs (p. 17). In addition, not all six studies recommended an expanded
role of service chiefs in acquisition management; however for those that made a recommendation
to increase the service chiefs’ involvement, the recommendations varied (p. 7). For example,
one study recommended more service chief involvement in the Navy by making him a co-chair
with the SAE during major program review, while another study recommended inserting the
service chief over PEOs and PMs (p. 10). All six studies did agree that changes to the
acquisition organization will not be adequate to address all of the challenges in major programs;
and that additional improvements need to be made in the program level, which include: welltrained and experienced acquisition workforce, sufficient tenure in program assignments to allow
for sufficient oversight; and incentives to attract and retain acquisition individuals (p. 12).
Despite the limited evidence in their review, GAO did agree that the current acquisition process
9

is not efficient or function as planned, and more discipline and accountability is needed. GAO
recognized that even though changes to the organization can be important, it should not be the
priority to improve the acquisition process. More focus should be on building a robust
acquisition workforce and fostering an environment where incentives are aligned with good
acquisition practices (pp. 17-18). GAO did not make any recommendations following their
review.
Although the GAO review to the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee did not produce any
recommendations, it did recognize the need for building a stronger acquisition workforce. To
build a stronger acquisition workforce we need the right education, training, and experience.

2.1.2

Use of Technology for Simulation

Simulations-based design processes were used in the 1990s in major defense acquisition
programs (MDAP) that demonstrated “how” to effectively streamline the design phase in the
Acquisition Life Cycle Process. The use of simulations saved time, money, and manpower.
DoD supported the use of simulations-based acquisition throughout the lifecycle of the
weapons system due to the evidence of solid results from both the military and civilian sectors
that improved cost, schedule, productivity, and performance (Sanders, 1997, p. 75). The next
generation Naval Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, known as LPD17, a major defense program,
used (constructive) simulation in design modeling and discrete event simulation to analyze
mission criteria and requirements provided by the U.S. Navy (Hugan, 2000, p. 1407).
In 1995, The Secretary of Defense mandated the use of an integrated product and process
development (IPPD) concept and integrated product teams (IPT) to be applied throughout the life
cycle of acquisition process. This mandate forced military services to integrate multifunctional
10

teams into the acquisition process and use a systems engineering approach and common business
practices to understand and identify technical challenges and provide solutions earlier in the life
cycle rather than later. IPTs used virtual prototypes and computer simulation to the maximum
extent, in order to analyze their design models and make changes as necessary (Sanders, 1997,
pp. 74-75). Simulation analysts worked with ship designers to design a 3-dimensional ship, with
the most current physical design, using computer-aided design (CAD) software for the LPD17
program. Kinematic and discrete event simulations (DES) were used to validate the physical
design. For example, kinematic simulation validated the plausibility of access to cargo in a
proposed arrangement on the ship or the physical design parameters to meet required dimensions
for specific forklifts or the movement of cargo on and off the ship. Discrete event simulation
was used to analyze mission complete times of five different missions consisting of various
arrangements of cargo moves on/off the ship to evaluate potential challenges or conflicts that
may occur on different decks and areas of the ship. The results of the kinematic simulation and
DES analysis allowed for on-the-spot design modifications to the physical design of the ship
and/or cargo arrangements to take place with the guidance of senior naval officers (Hugan, 2000,
pp. 1407-1409).
According to Sanders (1997), the use of design modeling and analysis simulation earlier in
the LPD17 program saved the U.S. Navy approximately $6 million in design costs and improved
the ship’s performance by eliminating 100 tons in topside weight (p. 75). Not only was this
program able to lower costs and improve performance, but the cooperation and communication
between simulation analysts, ship designers and engineers, and naval leadership motivated all
stakeholders towards a common goal and reduced the time that it would normally take to draw
blueprints by hand.
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LPD17 program is just one of the first examples of successful use of modeling and simulation
and the use of IPPD and IPT. M&S continues to be used in the acquisition process of weapons
systems in the military, especially during its test and evaluation to reduce cost and time and
analyze the performance of the system from development to live fire test and evaluation (if
required). For example, hardware-in-the-loop simulation was used to evaluate the effectiveness
of the Javelin which has a cost avoidance of $5 million (NTSA, n.d.); and simulated ship shock
tests/ trials saves the Navy $75,000 per test (Battista, 2014).
Simulations have proven to be successful in streamlining acquisition efforts within the
technicalities of the systems acquisition life cycle, which positively affects the streamlining of
the administrative efforts of the acquisition life cycle by reducing overall cost and time and
ensuring all performance requirements are met prior to initial or full-rate production.

2.1.3

Acquisition Education and Training

The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission final report and the Goldwater-Nichols DoD
Reorganization Act in 1986 forced DoD to also reexamine their education and training within
acquisition management. This resulted in the creation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) and the Army Acquisition Corps in 1990; and the establishment of
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) in 1991.
DAWIA defined the roles of key leaders and provided the framework for required training,
education, experience, and professional development guidance for the acquisition workforce
(military and civilian). This includes available internships and fellowships for civilian personnel
and required experience and assignment timeframes for both civilian and military acquisition
personnel. This Act was introduced to Congress on June 28, 1990, and enacted through PL 10112

510 in November 1990. Since 1990, DAWIA has been amended six times as required by public
law. DAWIA provided the guidance for the development of the DAU curriculum, in order to
properly inform, educate, and train the acquisition workforce.
In the early 2000s, defense acquisition was experiencing the effects of its recent reformation
during the Clinton Administration, of which over 60 acquisition reform initiatives were proposed
and less than half of those initiatives were implemented within the DOD 5000-series
documentation, Defense Acquisition System, in 2001. This series of documentation provide
acquisition policy guidelines for the acquisition community to follow and is considered a
handbook for program managers on how to do their jobs. Some of those initiatives included
integrated process teams to improve communication between functional areas, modified
integrated program summary to reduce program management reports, best-value contracting
opposed to lowest cost, and the elimination of military specifications, reduced contract data
requirements lists, and electronic processing to reduce the amount of “red tape” (Hanks,
Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005, pp. 26-30).
Although not all of the reform initiatives were addressed in the 2001 publication of the DOD
5000-series, they were being covered in the DAU curriculum. DAU’s purpose was and
continues to be to educate the acquisition workforce through an in depth curriculum. Its
curriculum expanded from 15 subjects and 11 career field descriptions in 2001 to (currently) 23
subjects and 14 career field descriptions (see Tables 2-1 and 2-2). Each career field has
requirements to achieve levels of certification. All acquisition personnel are encouraged to
accomplish each certification level and to maintain knowledge proficiency in that (specific)
career field through continuous learning modules.
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Table 2-1: DAU Subjects (2001 and 2015)
2001
Acquisition Management
Auditing
Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Managmenet
Contemporary Approaches to Acquisition Reform
Contracting
Grants
Industrial/Contract Property Management
Information Resource Management
Acquisition Law
Logistics
Program Management
Production, Quality, and Manufacturing
Software Acquisition Management
Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering
Test and Evaluation

2015
Acquisition Management
Auditing
Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management
Contract Management - Air Operations
Contract Management - Manufacturing
Contract Management - Quality
Contract Management - Software
Contracting
Contracting Officer's Representative
Engineering
Facilities Engineering
Grants
Industrial/Contract Property Management
Information Resource Management
Logistics
Program Management
Production, Quality, and Manufacturing
Requirements Management
Software Acquisition Management
Science and Technogoly Management
Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering
Test and Evaluation

Sources:
Note. List of 2001 DAU subjects. Adapted from Defense Acquisition University 2001 Catalog
(p. iii-v), by Sondheimer, K., & Gonzalez, D. (Eds.), n.d., Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense
Acquisition University Press.
Note. List of 2015 DAU subjects. Adapted from Defense Acquisition University 2015 Catalog
(p. various), Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Acquisition University Press.
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Table 2-2: DAU Career Field Descriptions (2001 and 2015)
2001
Acquisition Logistics
Auditing
Business, Const Estimating, and Financial Management
Contracting
Industrial and/or Contract Property Management
Information Technology
Manufacturing and Production
Program Management
Purchasing
Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering
Test and Evaluation

2015
Auditing
Business - Cost Estimating
Business - Financial Management
Contracting
Engineering
Facilities Engineering
Industrial/Contract Property Management
Information Technology
Life Cycle Logistics
Production, Quality and Manufacturing
Program Management
Purchasing
Science & Technology Management
Test and Evaulation

Sources:
Note. List of 2001 DAU subjects. Adapted from Defense Acquisition University 2001 Catalog
(p. iii), by Sondheimer, K., & Gonzalez, D. (Eds.), n.d., Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense
Acquisition University Press.
Note. List of 2015 DAU subjects. Adapted from Defense Acquisition University 2015 Catalog
(p.various), Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Acquisition University Press.

The change(s) that DAU experienced was in response to the mandates set by law; customer
and stakeholder expectations; and the value that knowledge has in the acquisition spectrum.
According to Layton, E. (2007), balancing three distinct elements are required for a properly
functioning acquisition system: (1) policy, procedures, and processes governing the system; (2)
the organization that executes the policy, procedures, and processes; and (3) personnel that make
the system work (p. 3). DAU is the driving force in acquisition training and an important aspect
to ensure that personnel receive the proper training in their (acquisition) career field and maintain
training proficiency through continuous learning modules so that acquisition personnel can
achieve Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certifications.
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Certification does not necessarily mean qualification. A well-rounded acquisition leader has
education, training, and EXPERIENCE and the current standards do not meet the required
hands-on experience required to be a proficient key leader in the acquisition workforce. For
example, the certification standards for DAWIA Level III certification focuses on functional
training provided by DAU and four years in program management with cost, schedule, and
performance responsibilities of which at least two years shall be working in a program office or
similar organization that directly support a Program Manager (PM), Program Executive Office
(PEO), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) program integrator, or supervisor of
shipbuilding. Furthermore, the program management experience need not be cumulative
(icatalog.dau.mil). Appendix A provides more depth information on the required DAWIA core
certification standards for program management.

2.1.4

Acquisition Experience and Officer Professional Development

When the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) was established in 1990, it was a single-track
career field for officers in the following functional areas: research, development, and acquisition
(FA51); system automation (FA53); and contracting and industrial management (FA97). To
build the AAC, a selection and accession board was developed to screen officers who had
acquisition experience, military schooling, a civil education degree, and distribution of quality
based on their evaluation reports. The selected officers were afforded the opportunity of
obtaining a master’s degree through the Advanced Civil School (ACS) program, followed by a
nine-week Materiel Acquisition Management (MAM) course prior to the first acquisition
assignment which is coded to the appropriate functional area primacy that he holds. Following
the first acquisition assignment, the officer attends the Command and General Staff College
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(C&GSC) program for ten months or complete via correspondence before promotion to
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC). Upon completion of C&GSC, the officer enters the second
acquisition assignment based on his functional area. At this time, the officer is between his 15th
and 17th year of service. After his second assignment, he attends a 20-week Program
Management course. If the officer entered the zone of eligibility for promotion to LTC, his
records were reviewed to determine compliance with acquisition certification criteria. If he met
all criteria, then he was identified as a certified acquisition manager, if not, but could be qualified
within two years, then he would be retained in the AAC. If he was unable to meet certification
standards by the end of the two-year period, then he was disenrolled from AAC and returned to
his branch and functional area career fields. If the officer was promoted to the rank of LTC and
met all certification standards for an acquisition manager, then he served either as a program
manager selected by a board or another critical acquisition assignment that required a certified
officer. The officer is considered for additional military schooling at the senior service college if
being considered for the rank of Colonel (COL), followed by a program manager position
selected by a board (Huffman, 1991, pp. 24-26).
Under the initial model of an AAC officer, the officer was afforded at least two acquisition
assignments before being considered for program manager selection. According to Lieutenant
General (Retired) William Phillips (2011), former Military Deputy ASA(ALT) at U.S. Army, it
takes a minimum of five years and up to 10 years to be highly qualified as a contracting officer
(p.iii). Although he was speaking from a personal experience perspective for contracting,
nevertheless as the senior military representative in AAC he realized that experience is essential
to gain expert efficiency in a primary acquisition career field (ACF). Does a 20-week program
management course qualify an officer to be a program manager?
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Since the establishment of the AAC in the 1990s, it has significantly expanded and improved
its organization and education and training for its workforce, especially considering the
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations
Report (2007) which revealed the requirement of urgent reform in Army expeditionary
contracting due to the lack of experienced military contracting personnel. In 2011, Honorable
Decker and General (Retired) Wagner, Jr., submitted their report on the Army Acquisition
Review where they formed a panel of experts to develop recommendations on improving the
Army acquisition processes. The panel developed 63 recommendations for improving Army
acquisitions from restructuring the acquisition organization to funding, education, and
experience. One of the recommendations that the Army agreed to implement was that program,
project and product manager should possess a broad range of experience and assignments that
reflect their qualifications because assignment of personnel with extensive experience could
improve the management of Army programs (p. 17). A Defense News article by Tilghman &
Weisgerber (2011), echoed the panel’s recommendation for experienced personnel in program,
project, and product manager positions. The article had urged DoD to rethink their strategy on
selecting program managers due to the inexperience of some program managers in making cost,
schedule, and performance decisions.
DoD realized that continuous changes were necessary to ensure a robust acquisition
workforce. Some of the changes to the officer career timeline since the inception of the AAC
were:
1. No required master’s degree program. Each officer is allowed to complete for ACS slots to
obtain a scholarship for his master’s degree and encouraged to obtain a required number of
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business management semester hours or equivalent to be viable for the AAC membership. This
allowed for time to be spent on broadening assignments if no ACS was required.
2. FA51 Basic Qualification Course (BQC) covered contracting and program management over
the period of 14-16 weeks which replaced the nine-week MAM course and increased education
requirements in both contracting and program management. First-time acquisition officers are
required to attend the series of consecutive courses offered during FA51 BQC prior to their first
acquisition assignment.
3. An overall Army change from C&GSC to an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course that
allows officers (prior to their promotion eligibility to LTC) to attend via 10-month residency, 15week short course, or online correspondence; however AAC officers are only afforded the
opportunity to attend via short-course or online considering their career timeline.
4. Following the officer’s first or second acquisition assignment and prior to their promotion to
LTC, he shall attend a 3-week intermediate qualification course (IQC) specific to AAC. This is a
broadening opportunity to learn from peers and colleagues of current and previous assignments
as well as different areas of the acquisition community.
5. Once the officer is selected for the AAC, he is no longer released back to his primary branch.
6. Acquisition now encompasses five ACFs with a human resources code of FA51 followed by
its appropriate ACF letter: program management (A), contracting (C), information technology
(R), testing and evaluation (T), and systems planning, research, development, and engineering
(S).
7. AAC no longer focuses on a single career track in the acquisition community. Officers are
expected to obtain DAWIA Level III certification in at least two ACFs; and one of the two shall
be contracting or program management.
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8. Officers in the ranks of LTC and COL who have been designated through a central selection
list (CSL) for command positions shall attend a one-week Army contracting pre-command
course prior to their command assignment.
9. AAC officers shall work with their rater to develop a five year acquisition career plan using
the Career Acquisition Personnel and Position Management Information system (CAPPMIS).
This is a great tool to track and/or approve education and training requirements of the AAC
officer and submit for certification approval and AAC membership.
10. DAWIA certification required to meet education and training competency levels.
11. Continuous learning modules are encouraged to maintain proficiency in a specific ACF.
Prior to being accessed into the AAC as a functional area in an active duty officer’s career,
there are several assignments that he shall complete. This includes, military education in their
basic branch and at least two 3-year tours (see Figure 2-4). In accordance with Department of
the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development (2014), about 80 to 120
active duty Army captains are accessed each year into the AAC between their 5th and 9th years of
service as an officer (p. 16). This number varies based on AAC requirements to fill the Military
Acquisition Position List(ing) (MAPL). The MAPL identifies all eligible acquisition officer
positions for each rank grade and ACF. The MAPL undergoes a quarterly review and all AAC
officer positions are updated and approved by the Principal Military Deputy (PMILDEP) and
then uploaded into the Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS).
According to the US Army Acquisition Support Center (n.d.), there are two methods of entry
into the AAC – career field designation (CFD) board, which is also known as an accession, and
the voluntary transfer incentive program (VTIP). The requirements for both methods of entry
are:
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1. Be in a grade of Captain (CPT) with demonstrated outstanding performance in the key
developmental position for his basic branch.
2. Be a graduate of the Captain’s Career Course (Branch Immaterial).
The CFD board is held annually prior to the officer’s year group’s functional designation
board. For an officer to be considered for the Acquisition CFD board he shall submit his request
through his (basic) branch manager. For example a Quartermaster Corps officer will submit his
request for the Acquisition CFD to his Quartermaster Corps branch manager. The VTIP is
conducted on a quarterly basis for officer’s who missed the Acquisition CFD board for their year
group. For an officer to be considered to transfer into the AAC through the VTIP, he shall
submit his request through his (basic) branch manager. If the officer is selected via VTIP, then
he incurs a three-year active duty service obligation.
Once the officer is selected for the AAC, he is placed in one of five DoD ACFs – program
management; contracting; systems, planning, research, development and engineering – science
and technology management; information technology, and test and evaluation – and attends 14 to
16 weeks of DAU training prior to his first acquisition assignment. The purpose of the training
is to familiarize newly appointed Army acquisition officers with the AAC and its policies and
procedures; and complete all required core acquisition and functional training in program
management and contracting up to Level II DAWIA required education and training.
Upon successful completion of DAU training, the Army acquisition officer has a proficiency
level of novice in the AAC. His civilian grade equivalent is a GS-12 or GS-13 with at least an
advanced proficiency level in their primary acquisition career field (see Appendices B and C).
Figure 2-3 illustrates the current Army AAC officer development timeline and emphasizes the
career milestones to be both competitive with both AAC and primary branch peers. These
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milestones are required for promotion and nominative assignments, as well as steady progression
as an Army officer. The competency gained during one acquisition assignment does not
necessarily rollover to the next acquisition assignment. The figure below develops a broadened
acquisition officer, not necessarily a master/ expert in one ACF prior to the zone of consideration
for the rank of LTC.

Figure 2-3: Army Acquisition Corps officer development timeline.
Note. Adapted from Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,
by Department of the Army, p.442, 2014, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the
Army.
According to the Acquisition Management Branch (2014), regionalization assignment have
been officially rescinded as of the first quarter of fiscal 2015. Regionalization is a four-year
assignment, which allows the officer to progress at one duty station within the program
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management and/or contracting management organization associated with that duty assignment.
Since rescinding, the AAC officer is assigned a two-year assignment with permanent change of
station (PCS) availability upon completion of the assignment. This does little to assist with
increasing the proficiency level of the AAC officer so he is at least equivalent to his civilian
counterpart prior to promotion to LTC.
According to 10 U.S. code, Ch. 87, Sec. 1735 before assignment to a critical acquisition
positions (CAP) in program management of increasing level, he shall:
1. Be in the grade of LTC or higher and
2. Agree to remain on active duty for a minimum period of three years while in a CAP or
3. At least until completion of a major milestone that occurs closest to the date where the officer
has served in the program manager or deputy program manager position for a major defense
acquisition program for four-years and
4. Complete the program management course at the Defense Systems Management College or
an accredited institution determined to be comparable by the Secretary of Defense and
5. Shall have at least eight years of acquisition experience with at least two years in a systems
program office or similar organization for a program manager position for a major defense
acquisition program or
6. Shall have at least six years of acquisition experience for a program manager position for a
non-major defense acquisition program or
7. Shall have at least six years of acquisition experience with at least two years in a systems
program office for a deputy program manager position for a major defense acquisition program
or
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8. Shall have at least four years of acquisition experience for a deputy program manager position
of a non-major defense acquisition program.
The major weakness to these requirements is acquisition experience is not well-defined in
CAP requirements.
1. Experience can range between two different ACFs or number of years in the AAC since being
transferred or accessed.
2. Experience may not necessarily be required in the program of consideration for the CAP
assignment. For example, an acquisition officer may be assigned the deputy program manager of
a non-major defense acquisition program that he knows nothing about.
Good work experience marries retention. In order for a person to master a task or set of
task(s), he shall practice the task a number of times with the objective of being a master.
According to Proctor & Van Zandt (2008), how a person practices a skill determines how
quickly he is able to master the skill, how long he remembers the skill, and the extent to which
the skill will result in an improved performance for other tasks (p. 383). This can be seen in
professional athletes. They perfected skills that have taken years to master.
Proctor & Van Zandt (2008), explained that more practice equals an increase in retention and
that an overlearning of a skill will results in better retention of those skills. The example that
they had given referred to the assembly and disassembly of the M60 machine gun, which was a
study of retention by Schendel and Hagman in 1982. There were three groups of soldiers – one
control group and two other groups. All soldiers were told taught how to assemble and
disassemble the weapon and were told to complete these tasks until no errors were made. The
control group received no further training and was retested at the end of the study, approximately
eight weeks later. The other two groups were over-trained at different time period during the
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study. One group was over-trained the first day of training after the initial assemble and
disassemble test, while the other group was over-trained halfway through the study period.
Despite the different time periods of overtraining, the soldiers in both of these groups made
additional assemblies equal to the amount of assemblies that they performed prior to their first
error-free execution. The study concluded that overtraining leads to better retention of skills (pp.
383-384).
Hands-on experience is required for key leadership positions in the acquisition workforce and
this can be further extended to all critical acquisition positions or lower. The change in the
regionalization program does allow for more broadening opportunities, but does not allow for
overtraining of mastered skills for increased retention.

2.2

Competency-Based Career Planning and Development

The Army has established an officer competency evolution timeline (see Figure 2.4) for the
general (officer) population; however, it does not address specific competencies for the
acquisition officer in program management.
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Figure 2-4: Officer Competency Evolution
Note. Adapted from Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,
by Department of the Army, p.29, 2014, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the
Army.

Figure 2-4 shows assignment and civil or military education milestones from the first to 28th
year in the active duty military. Assignments range between operational and non-operational
assignments throughout the officer’s career with required military education in between or
during assignments. The assignments that do not have a duty timeline are generally regarded as
anything less than a 3-year duty assignment. The officer competency model produces a wellrounded talented officer that has a diversified work experience in both joint and non-joint
assignments.
Competency goes beyond required education and training. It relies on work experience
gained, in order to apply the knowledge received from education and training. Granted, each
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acquisition position has accompanying responsibilities, but it does not have the associated
competency matrix.
Dabkowski, Huddleston, Kucik, & Lyle (2011) presented a discrete event simulation model
that explored the distribution of officer talent (operational versus non-operational) across the US
Army through attrition, promotion, and the need for operational and non-operational personnel
reflected in the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Table of
Distribution and Allowances (TDA). They presented their findings during the 2011 Winter
Simulation Conference. Their study resulted in recommending a three phase career path for all
military officers – Learn (operational), Practice (mixture of operational and non-operational),
and Lead (primarily non-operational).
The career model proposed developing non-operational experience earlier in an officer’s
midcareer, in order to shape and broaden senior ranks due to the fact that non-operational
assignments increase as rank progresses (Dabkowski et al, 2011). Although this recommended
path is a logical pattern for developing a broadened leader, considering the majority of
acquisition positions being non-operational, it does not allow for early AAC officer career
progression because there is no recommended change to the career field designation (CFD)
timeline. The CFD still occurs around the officer’s eighth year as an active duty officer (p.
2480).
The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (2014) has developed a contracting
competency assessment for the DoD contracting workforce to identify and address competency
gaps in personnel, training, and development; define competencies required for the contracting
workforce; and assess competences pertinent to the contracting workforce and identify gaps for
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current and future requirements. This is a great effort to address challenges in the contracting
workforce and highlights the importance of work experience, training, and education.

2.3

Summary

Acquisition streamlining has been ongoing since the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission
report in 1986. These streamlining efforts include restructuring the acquisition organization in
the Army to streamline administrative processes; simulation-based acquisition to reduce cost,
schedule and performance of a weapons system’s life cycle; the establishment of DAU and the
many faces of change that they have experienced in being the forefront in acquisition and
training; and the past and current active duty acquisition officer professional development and
required milestones and experiences currently required prior to being selected for a critical
acquisition position. The Army had also recognized and used competency-based career planning
and development to a general extent, but requires more efforts to ensure acquisition officers
possess at least an equivalent proficiency level to their civilian counterparts through successful
and extensive acquisition work experience in assignments that reflect their position.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
System analysis for improving the active duty Army acquisition officer personnel
management is a problem solving technique that will decompose the active duty AAC officer
professional development career path into components in order to study how well they work and
interact to achieve their purpose. Once each component of the career path is studied, they will be
reassembled into a proposed professional development system for an active duty AAC officer.

3.1

Define the Problem

The problem is to identify an active duty AAC officer professional development model that is
applicable for a successful program management career. The primary research question for this
thesis is: Is the current U.S. Army active duty officer professional development model adequate
to develop an acquisition officer whose primary career field designation is program
management? Army doctrine, primarily DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development
(2014) and the most recent DAWIA (2013) were used to address the following:
1. What is the current active duty AAC officer professional development model?
2. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current active duty professional development
model.
3. What changes should be made to the current active duty AC officer professional development
model?
4. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed changes.
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3.2

Assumptions

The assumptions used in the systems analysis include:
1. DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development, dated 2014, is the most recent
guidance used by the U.S. Army.
2. DAWIA, amendment 2013, is the most recent amended DAWIA used to guide an AAC
officer’s professional development to include education, training, experience required, and
length of duty assignments.
3. Studies of military officer professional development used to support this thesis and presented
in the literature review is accurate and true.
4. The proficiency level after FA51 BQC remains novice in acquisition.
5. The current and proposed models do not take into consideration prior active duty service.
6. Competency standards are comprised of education, training, and experience.
7. Current education and training standards are efficient.
8. Acquisition work experience needs improvement.
9. Models do not take into account deployments and temporary duty during each acquisition
assignment.

3.3

Current Model

The literature review provided a foundational knowledge to understand the motivation behind
the research question and the persistent need for improving the acquisition workforce, primarily
work experience. Let’s look at the current officer model flow (see Figure 3-1) to identify its
strengths and weaknesses. This model is generic in nature and does not reflect each individual
active duty AAC officer’s unique career path. The timeframes in each module are used in the
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figure to illustrate an approximate timeframe based on information received from DA Pamphlet
600-3 and DAWIA.

Figure 3-1: Current Active Duty AAC Officer Flow
Note. Adapted from Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,
by Department of the Army, pp.17 and 442, 2014, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of the Army.

The numbers above the progression arrow is shown in years for an active duty officer. The
current model takes into consideration varied timeframes of required military education and
training, like basic officer leadership course (BOLC) and the captain’s career course (CCC), for
all officers to remain competitive with their peer group. If the officer is selected by the AAC
CFD, then he shall complete his current assignment in his basic branch unless granted an early
release by his chain of command and basic branch to attend FA51 BQC prior to his permanent
change of station eligibility.
The strengths of the current active duty AAC officer development timeline include:
1. Allows the AAC officer to gain more than four years of operational military experience prior
to being accessed or transferred into the AAC, which allows the officer to be competitive with
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their basic branch peers and achieve at least an intermediate level of proficiency in his branch
depending on duty assignment.
2. Broadening opportunities to learn outside of the officer’s primary ACF, if the officer’s
timeline allows for it.
3. The AAC officer maintains military education requirements in order to remain competitive
with their peers across the Army.
4. The AAC officer receives required acquisition training throughout their acquisition career to
gain educational proficiency.
The weaknesses of the current AAC officer development timeline include:
1. CFD board has a larger time of consideration zone.
2. The timeline does not address proficiency levels with civilian counterparts of equivalent rank
who are currently actively working in the acquisition workforce prior to CAP requirements.
3. No regionalization for acquisition officers. Two-year assignments until CAP assignment with
no guarantee of consecutive assignments in the officer’s primary ACF.
4. ACS opportunities are not afforded to every acquisition officer. It is a competitive process
and takes into account the officer’s timeline. If the officer is not accepted into ACS, then he has
to obtain his master’s degree through another avenue.
5. Some officers may not have the opportunity for TWI due to a shorter timeline to achieve
DAWIA certification requirements. It is highly encouraged to obtain DAWIA Level III in the
primary ACF prior to the zone of eligibility for the rank of LTC.
6. Assignments are based on the “needs of the Army” which may not necessarily take into
consideration a program management or contracting position for the AAC officer’s first duty
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assignment. Officers may be assigned to positions other than program management or
contracting based on available positions at that time.

3.4

Proposed Model

The proposed active duty AAC officer model addresses negative encounters with
inexperienced personnel in the rank of LTC and above and challenges the AAC officer to gain an
expert proficiency in his primary ACF prior to being considered for promotion to LTC.

Figure 3-2: Proposed Active Duty AAC Officer Career Flow
Note. Some information were adapted from Commissioned Officer Professional Development
and Career Management, by Department of the Army, pp.17 and 442, 2014, Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The strengths of the proposed model are as follows:
1. Highlights the importance of experience gained in the AAC officer’s primary ACF.
2. The CFD board occurs following the officer’s first duty assignment and at least one key
leader position in accordance with their basic branch requirements for LT/CPT. There is no big
window for CFD consideration.
a. The officer learns and gains experience in the operational Army.
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b. The officer is promoted to the rank of CPT with his peers.
2. AAC officer is given more opportunities for broadening and developmental assignments to
include obtaining a master’s degree through the ACS program and/or taking advantage of a
training with industry (TWI) assignment to learn industry work habits and standards. A wider
timeline to gain hands-on work experience in other areas of acquisition prior to a CAP.
3. Introduces an internship opportunity for AAC officers that was only afforded to the civilian
acquisition workforce.
4. Re-establishes regionalization for the first duty assignment, but proposes assignments in one
ACF vice two within that four-year tour.
5. Allows the officer time to gain expert proficiency and overtraining in his primary ACF and
move to achieve at least an advanced level of proficiency in a secondary ACF prior to his
promotion zone to the rank of LTC.
6. If assignments are managed properly, then this model allows for at least a one-year overlap
between the subordinate’s (initial) four-year assignment and supervisor/senior leader three-year
assignment.
The weaknesses to the proposed model are as follows:
1. Limits initial operational experience.
2. Decreases the officer selection pool for the operational Army by removing basic branch
officers earlier in their career.
3. Does not address the short assignment periods past the first acquisition assignment. This may
have a negative effect on retention learned and gained from the first acquisition assignment.
4. Assignments are based on the “needs of the Army” which may not necessarily take into
consideration a program management or contracting position for the AAC officer’s first duty
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assignment. Officers may be assigned to positions other than program management or
contracting based on available positions at that time.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
4.1

Benefits

The benefits of introducing the systems analysis approach for improving the acquisition
workforce personnel management are:
1. Assumes that literature and previous studies identifying challenges in an inexperienced
workforce is true and accurate. This can also be a limitation.
2. Looks at what area or areas of a system that needs improvement by reviewing previous
studies and understanding why the model does not necessarily work as it should.
3. Allows for a proposed model (if needed) to be addressed to look at how that proposed model
could potentially improve the system.

4.2

Limitations

The limitation of using this approach for improving the acquisition workforce personnel
management are:
1. Assumes that literature and previous studies identifying challenges in an inexperienced
workforce is true and accurate. Literature and previous studies may not be as accurate or current
considering the many incremental changes that have occurred in acquisition streamlining.
2. The proposed model is not validated or tested through computer analysis or modeling. It is
based on logic and recommendations from literature reviews.
3. Does not take into account the natural attrition of officers, the current officer pool in
acquisition, or the number of positions available per rank per ACF.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Some of the issues that affect the streamlining process cannot be avoided, such as executive
appointments to key senior leadership positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
however, there are potential ways that the Army can positively affect change in the Acquisition
workforce which will subsequently influence the outcomes of the management of weapons
programs. The proposed model is an alternative to developing a more competent acquisition
officer who has not only the education and training, but the quality experience needed to fill
critical assignments to include key leadership positions. The AAC officer may still be a novice
after completing his FA51 BQC, but he shall become an expert in his primary ACF prior to his
below-the-zone of consideration for LTC.
The proposed model is based on several identifying factors from various analysis of the
acquisition platform, which led to the need for extensive (quality) acquisition experience for
personnel in key leadership positions. This thesis challenged Secretary Kendall’s initiative to
improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce through higher standards for key
leadership positions and that the current model does not allow the hands-on experienced required
to fill those positions. The current model allowed for too many broadening opportunities before
the officer’s zone of consideration for LTC, which took away from mastering hands-on skills
needed to be successful in critical and key leadership positions.
The proposed model highlighted greater work experience to be over-trained during the first
duty acquisition duty assignment. Retention of skills is increased with more practice. If a future
critical or key leader has more “practice” in the tasks required to succeed in those positions
earlier rather than later in his acquisition career, then he can quickly attain mastery and an expert
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proficiency and be on the same level of proficiency as his civilian counterparts; and are truly
proficient enough to handle increased responsibilities as an acquisition officer.

5.1

Future Analysis

Although this thesis is a proposal based on literature review and logic. It lays down a
foundation for future analysis for confirmed input and output variables to be developed with the
assistance of key stakeholders to test and validate the proposed model using discrete event
simulation or other computer modeling analysis. The key stakeholders are the human resources
department for both the AAC Center of Excellence and the Department of the Army.
Prior to fully creating the proposed DES model the following shall be considered:
1. Consult with and confirm stakeholder requirements which includes human resources
management concerns for the AAC and Department of the Army.
2. Consult with and confirm stakeholder requirements for validation performance measures.
3. Consult with and confirm stakeholder requirements for output performance measures.
4. Confirm any changes to the FA51 BQC training curriculum prior to the first acquisition
assignment.
5. Conduct further research on the average amount of time it takes for the “normal” human brain
to “lose” information learned from education if it is not applied in the workplace.
6. Conduct further research on the learning curve rate when applying education in the
workplace.
7. Research the business industry’s model on career progression keeping in mind the longevity
of assigned positions, in order to run a regression analysis.
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Validation is needed to provide evidentiary support to the proposed changes and confirm early
intervention in an active duty AAC officer’s career for proper development and career
progression in program management. In addition to a computer modeling analysis, a survey and
analysis targeting current acquisition officers is recommended for future research, in order to
receive a baseline perspective of the current AAC officer flow and whether or not the results of
the survey supports the proposed changes. The survey shall include both questionnaire (closed
and open-ended questions) and interviews.
In order to move forward with this project and follow through with recommendations for
future analysis, support from the AAC Center of Excellence and the PMILDEP ASA(ALT) is
needed. The PMILDEP ASA(ALT) is the most senior military officer/leader in the AAC, and
the AAC Center of Excellence is the primary resource for the MAPL. Receiving their support is
extremely important because highlighting the need for improving hands-on experience in
program management affects not only acquisition officer management as a whole, but it has the
potential to change the role of the AAC from military functional area to a (true) acquisition
profession for all military officers.

5.1.1

Benefits

Some of the benefits to using computer modeling analysis to study personnel management
are:
1. Illustrate to key stakeholders the answers to research questions.
2. Illustrate to key leaders the current career path for most acquisition officers from their first
active duty assignment to their first acquisition assignment.
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3. Senior military officers whom are in positions to affect change have a visual to better
understand the potential (positive) impact that can be made to improve the AAC officer
proficiency level.
4. Compare and contrast alternative(s) and current career path prior to executing any personnel
changes.
5. Determine the best alternative (if any).
6. Determine the best time to intervene in the path to develop an AAC officer so that he can
begin gaining the “hands-on” training he will need to progress to a key leader position.
7. Model validation is statistically supported.
8. Results of alternatives are statistically supported.

5.1.2

Limitations

Some of the limitation factors to using the proposed career path model for model analysis are:
1. Potential challenge to determine data collection requirements due to changes in policies and
procedures that may have affected the acquisition accession process.
2. Statistical support to determine the best alternative (if any) may not necessarily be the best
recommendation when it is implemented.
3. Does not determine the best assignment for the newly appointed AAC officer.
4. Does not track proficiency level progression during and after the first acquisition assignment.
5. Does not compare and contrast civilian rank equivalent career path.
6. Further data collection may be needed for further analysis of the best alternative (if any) prior
to making any policy and procedural changes that affect AAC officers.
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5.2

Final Conclusion

The systems analysis approach to study the career progression of an AAC officer is a small
step that may lead further study and analysis on testing and validating the proposed model in this
thesis. The results of future analysis may persuade the DA to make incremental changes to their
officer personnel management system, with a focus on how to improve the opportunities for
AAC officers to gain hands-on experience in program management. If the AAC officer career
progression changes to allow newly appointed AAC officers to enter the AAC earlier in their
military career, then it may have a positive affect in acquisition streamlining and DA will
manage to address the concerns of inexperienced leadership in program management in the
AAC. The DA will have a pool of proficient AAC officers to place in key leadership positions
whom will have a proven successful (acquisition) track record, where he or she can promote
good acquisition decisions based on experience, knowledge, and training. Experience and
retention are married; and over-training increases retention.

41

APPENDIX A:
REQUIRED DAWIA CERTIFICATION STANDARDS FOR PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT CAREER FIELD
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Table 5-1: Level I Core Certification Standards (required)
Acquisition Training
Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management
(DAU)
Fundamentals of Systems Planning, Research, Development, and Engineering
Functional Training
Cost Analysis
(DAU)
Introduction to Earned Value Management
Education
Formal education not required
Experience
One year of acquisition experience with cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities

Source: Note. Information adapted from Certification standards & core plus development guide
program management level I.by Defense Acquisition University, n.d., from
http://icatalog.dau.mil.

Table 5-2: Level II Core Certification Standards (required)
Acquisition Training Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part A
(DAU)
Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part B
Program Management Tools Course, Part I
Program Management Tools Course, Part II
Contract Planning
Functional Training Contract Execution
(DAU)
Contract Management
Fundamentals of Earned Value Management
Basic Information Systems Acquisition (can be substitued with Systems Acquisition
Management until 01 October 2016, if completed after 15 November 2005)
Education
Formal education not required
Experience
Two years of acquisition experience with cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities

Source: Note. Information adapted from Certification standards & core plus development guide
program management level II.by Defense Acquisition University, n.d., from
http://icatalog.dau.mil.
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Table 5-3: Level III Core Certification Standards (required)
Acquisition Training
None required
(DAU)
Fundamentals of Business Financial Management
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability
Program Management Office Course, Part A
Functional Training Program Management Office Course, Part B
(DAU)
Intermediate Systems Planning, Research, Development, and Engineering, Part I
The below courses are added starting on 01 October 2015
Understanding Industry (Business Acumen)
Principles of Schedule Management
Education
Formal education not required
Four years in program management with cost, schedule and performance responsibilities
At least two years in a program office or similar organization (dedicated matrix support to
a PM, PEO, DCMA program integrator, or supervisor of shipbuilding). The two years
may run concurrent to the four year requirement.
OR
Experience
Level III DAWIA certification in another acquisition CFD
Two years in program management in cost, schedule and performance responsibilities
Two years in a program office or similar organization (dedicated matrix support to a PM,
PEO, DCMA program integrator, or supervisor of shipbuilding). The two years may run
concurrent to the Level III or two year requirement.

Source: Note. Information adapted from Certification standards & core plus development guide
program management level III.by Defense Acquisition University, n.d., from
http://icatalog.dau.mil.
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Table 5-4: Military and Civilian Equivalency and Proficiency

Military
Grade

Civilian
Grade
Equivalent

Recommended
Proficiency
Score

Proficiency
Level

O-9

ES-05/06

5

Expert

O-8

ES-03/04

5

Expert

O-7

ES-01/02

5

Expert

O-6

GS-15

5

Expert

O-5

GS-14

4 or 5

Advanced or
Expert

O-4

GS-13

4

Advanced

O-3

GS-12

4

Advanced

O-2

GS-11

3 or 4

Intermediate
or Advanced

O-1

GS-9

3

Intermediate

Sources:
Note. Military and civilian equivalency adapted from Department of defense working capital
funds civilian/military equivalent rate fiscal year 2002 by Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), 2001 from http://comptroller.defense.gov.
Note: Proficiency score and proficiency level adapted from NIH suggested proficiency map by
Office of Human Resources at the National Institutes of Health, 2015 from hr.od.nigh.gov.
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Table 5-5: Proficiency Scale
Score
1

2

3

Level
Description
Fundamental Common knowledge or understanding of basic techniques and concepts.
Awareness
(basic
Focus on learning.
knowledge)
Experience gained in classroom and/or experimental scenarios as an on-the-job trainee.
Help is expected to perform skills.
Novice
Focus on developing through on-the-job training;
(limited
Has an understanding and can discuss terminology, concepts, principles, and issues
experience)
related to this competency;
Utilizes a range of reference and resource materials.
Can successfully complete tasks in this competency as requested. Help from an expert
may be required, but can usually perform the skill independently.
Intermediate Focus on applying and enhancing knowledge or skill;
(practical
Apply this competency on occasions under minimal guidance to perform successfully;
application)
Understand and discuss the application and implications of changes to processes,
policies, and procedures in this area.
Perform associated actions requiring this skill without assistance. "Go to" person within
the immediate organization to answer difficult questions.

4

Focus on broad organization/professional issues;
Advanced Consistently provide practical/relevant ideas and perspectives on process or practice
(applied improvements which may easily be implemented;
theory)
Capable of coaching others by translating complex nuances into simpler terms;
Participate in senior level discussions;
Assist in the development of reference and resource materials.
Known as the expert in your career field. Can provide guidance, troubleshoot and
answer questions at this area of expertise and the field where the skill is used.

5

Focus on strategic;
Demonstrate consistent excellence in applying this competency across multiple projects
Expert
and/or organizations;
(recognized
Create new applications for and/or lead the development of reference and resource
authority)
materials;
Able to diagram or explain the relevant process elements and issues in relation to
organizational issues and trends in sufficient detail during discussions and presentation,
to foster a greater understanding among internal and external colleagues and constituents.

Source: Note: Proficiency scale adapted from Competencies proficiency scale by Office of
Human Resources at the National Institutes of Health, 2009 from hr.od.nigh.gov.
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